This work studies Nash equilibria for heterogeneous games where both coordinating and anti-coordinating agents coexist. Whilst games with only coordinating or only anticoordinating agents are potential also in the presence of heterogenities, this is no longer true for games when a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating players interact. We provide a complete characterization of the set of Nash equilibria for games with mixed coordinating and anti-coordinating agents with heterogeneous utilities interacting on an all-to-all network.
INTRODUCTION
In games of strategic complements, the best response action of a player is increasing in the action of the other players. Examples of such games include the adoption of a new technology, beliefs or behavioral attitudes in social influence systems, or cooperative interchanges among economical actors. In games of strategic substitutes just the opposite happens, the best response action of a player is decreasing in the action of the other players. Applications of such models include, for example, local public good provision, information gathering, firms interacting in competitive markets.
While these two classes of games have received considerable attention in recent literature (Jackson and Zenou (2015) , Bramoullé (2007) ), relatively unexplored are mixed models where these two strategic interactions coexist. However, examples of social or economic model where such behaviors coexist are rather frequent, e.g., collecting actions, interacting firms with cooperative and competitive features.
In this paper, we focus on a particular instance of such heterogeneous models. We consider games where actions are all binary {−1, +1} and players are split into two classes: one of coordinating agents and one of anti-coordinating agents. That of coordination and anti-coordination games are two basic examples of games with respectively strategic complements and strategic substitutes. Coordinating agents have an incentive for action 1 when such action is played by a fraction of the remaining players above a certain threshold while anti-coordinating agents have an Giacomo Como is also with the Department of Automatic Control, Lund University, Sweden. This work was partially supported by MIUR grant Dipartimenti di Eccellenza 2018 -2022 , the Swedish Research Council, and by the Compagnia di San Paolo.
incentive for action 1 when such action is played by a fraction of the remaining players below a certain threshold. We will refer to such models as mixed coordination/anticoordination (CAC) games.
Our aim is to study Nash equilibria in mixed CAC games. Pure coordination games and pure anti-coordination games always admit Nash equilibria as they are potential games (Monderer and Shapley (1996) ) also when the thresholds are heterogeneous. Instead general mixed CAC games are no longer potential and the existence of Nash equilibria is not guaranteed. Furthermore, even when existence is guaranteed, the set of Nash equilibria is in general unknown. For the special case of coordinating agents with identical thresholds, a characterization of the Nash equilibria was proposed by Morris (2000) .
There is a related literature where the best-response dynamics is analyzed, in particular its convergence to Nash equilibria. Ramazi et al. (2016) proved that the asynchronous best-response dynamics of pure coordination games and pure anti-coordination games will almost surely converge to Nash equilibria for every network topology and every set of thresholds. Granovetter (1978) studied the synchronous best-response dynamics of coordinating agents as a linear threshold model. Similar results have been generalized to configuration models by Rossi et al. (2017) and to games with a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents by Grabisch and Li (2019) . Other results concern time of convergence of asynchronous bestresponse dynamics and its dependence on the network structure (Ellison (1993) , Kandori et al. (1993) , Montanari and Saberi (2010) ).
Our contribution is a throughout analysis on the existence and the structure of pure strategy Nash equilibria for mixed coordination/anti-coordination (CAC) games with possibly heterogeneous activation thresholds. In particular we give the following contributions: (i) We establish a checkable necessary and sufficient condition involving the cumulative distribution functions for the thresholds for the existence of NE of a general mixed CAC game with heterogeneous thresholds; and (ii) In the special case when only coordinating or anti-coordinating agents are present we classify all NE and determine their cardinality. While existence was well known in the literature, to the best of our knowledge such precise characterization was not yet presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model, we explicit the best response function and we make some general observations on Nash equilibria by studying the potential property of the game. Once introduced the needed notation, to give an intuition of the upcoming results, we conclude section 2 by providing a brief analysis of the game with an infinite population.
In section 3, we present our main result. Specifically, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for an action configuration to be a Nash equilibrium of the mixed CAC game and we provide a complete analysis of the Nash equilibria of the coordination game and the anticoordination game as special cases.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section we define a game to model the situation where diversified agents interact with opposite interests over a fully connected system.
Definition of the game
Let V be the agent set. Given a partition of the set V c ∪ V a = V, V c ∩ V a = ∅, we denote
Definition. The mixed coordination/anti-coordination(CAC) game with agent weights {d i } i∈V , d i ∈ R has action set A = {−1, +1}, action configuration space X = A V and utilities {u i } i∈V : X → R such that
Nodes in V c ⊆ V are called coordinating agents, since they have a positive incentive in choosing the same action of another agent and a disadvantage in picking the opposite one, while nodes in V a = V \V c are called anti-coordinating agents, as they have a disadvantage in choosing the same action of another agent and an incentive in picking the opposite one.
In the special cases when only one type of agents is present, namely V c = V or V a = V, we will simply call it, coordination game or, respectively, anti-coordination game.
The quantities d i , i ∈ V are weights associated to the agents. They represent the individual tendency of agents in choosing an action over the other. Indeed, the sign of weights d i , along with δ i , determines which is the risk dominant action, i.e., which is the best action for agent i when she is not subjected to any external influences. If d i = 0 the two actions are called risk-neutral.
Best response and Nash equilibria
Recall that, in a game, agents are assumed to be rational and they choose their action with the aim of maximizing the utility function. Given an agent i ∈ V and any choice of actions x −i ∈ A V\{i} , the best response (BR) function of the agent is defined as the set-valued function
In the mixed CAC game, the best response function of an agent i ∈ V can be expressed in terms of the aggregated information on the actions played by the remaining players. If we define, for each agent i ∈ V,
the best response function of an agent i ∈ V of the mixed CAC game is given by
is the fraction of neighbors of i playing action 1. Depending if this fraction is above or below r i the best response of agent i changes. Hence, r i is called the threshold of agent i.
We will call stubborn agents the agents having r i > 1 or r i < −1, as their best response function is constantly equal to {−1} or {+1}, independently of the actions of other agents.
A Nash equilibria is any configuration x ∈ X such that x i ∈ B i (x −i ) for any agent i ∈ V. In the following we will denote by N the set of Nash equilibria of the game.
Both the coordination game and the anti-coordination game, for any possible choice of the weights, are potential games (Monderer and Shapley (1996) ). This fact is very well known in case of homogeneous thresholds, but actually holds in general. Indeed, if we define the two functions
we can derive from (1) that, depending if the game is a coordination or an anti-coordination one, it respectively holds
The potential property guarantees the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium, which is a maximum point of the potential function. If there are no stubborn agents, the two consensus configurations, namely 1 and −1, are Nash equilibria for any set of agent weights. This is a peculiar property of coordination games. In general, an explicit characterization of all the Nash equilibria is hard to find.
On the other hand, it is enough for a coordinating agent to interact with an anti-coordinating agent to lose the potential property, i.e. if V c = ∅ and V a = ∅ the mixed CAC game is not a potential game.
Hence, the study of Nash equilibria for the mixed CAC game is a challenging problem and not even the existence of such configuration is guaranteed, as the following simple example shows.
Example.
Let us consider the very simple case of a two-player game with V c = {1} and V a = {2} where both agents have weights d i = 0 (Fig. 1 ). This is known as the discoordination game or matching pennies game, since it describes the situation where one agent aims at coordinating while the other wants to play an action that is different from its opponent's. The discoordination game admits no Nash equilibria. 
The formalism of distribution functions
We now set some notation that will be used throughout the rest of the paper.
• n c = |V c | and n a = |V a | are the number of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents respectively, while α = n c /n is the fraction of coordinating agents. • Given a configuration x ∈ X , we denote by z(x), z c (x), z a (x) the fraction of agents that in x are playing action 1 in, respectively, the total population, in the set of coordinating agents, and in the set of anti-coordinating agents:
Furthermore, we recall the definition of the threshold cumulative distribution function (CDF) that returns the fraction of the agents having threshold less or equal than a given value. In formulas, F :
In general, the threshold CDF is non-decreasing, piecewise constant and continuous to the right with discontinuities occurring at points r i , i ∈ V.
Similarly, we recall that the threshold complementary cumulative distribution function(CCDF) returns the fraction of agents having threshold greater than a given value. In formulas, G : R → 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 is such that
Note that G(z) = 1 − F (z). Accordingly, the threshold CCDF is non-increasing, piece-wise constant and continuous to the right with discontinuities occurring at points r i , i ∈ V. Fig. 2 . We study the fixed point equation (13) for Example 1. On the left, we study α < 1 2 , on the right α > 1 2 . We denote the threshold CDF of the coordinating agents by F c and threshold CCDF of the anti-coordinating agents by G a .
Infinite population
To give an intuition of the results that will be presented in the next section, we will briefly study the case of an infinite population of agents where a percentage α ∈ [0, 1] of the population is made of coordinating agents, while the remaining agents are anti-coordinating. Furthermore, we assume that F c : R → [0, 1] and G a : R → [0, 1] are continuous functions.
In this special case, Nash equilibria are triples z
If we denote H α (z) := αF c (z) + (1 − α)G a (z) , (12) the system in (11) admits a solution if and only if ∃z * ∈ [0, 1] satisfying z * = H α (z * ) (13) Since H α : R → [0, 1] is continuous, it is always possible to find z * ∈ [0, 1] such that (13) is satisfied. The equilibrium is then found by setting z * c = F c (z * α ) and z * a = G a (z * α ). Hence, if the population is infinite and F c and G a are continuous, the mixed CAC game admits Nash equilibria.
Example 1. If the thresholds of the coordinating agents are uniformly distributed in [0, 1], as well as the thresholds of the anti-coordinating agents, i.e. F c (z) = z1 [0, 1] 
Note that H α is increasing if α > 1 2 , namely if the coordinating agents constitute the majority of the population, and decreasing if α < 1 2 , which is the case of a majority of anti-coordinating agents. Note that there is just one solution of (13) that is z * = 1 2 regardless of the value of α (Fig. 2) .
Example 2. If coordinating agents and anti-coordinating agents have the same threshold CDF, i.e., F c (z) = 1 − G a (z), then H α is monotone. Specifically, H α is nondecreasing if α > 1 2 and non-increasing if α < 1 2 . Note that if α < 1 2 equation (13) admits exactly one solution. (Fig. 3) . Fig. 3 . On the left, we study the fixed point equation (13) for Example 2 when thresholds are normally distributed (µ = 0.3 , σ = 0.1). On the right, F c = 1 − G a and monotonicity is not guaranteed.
NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we investigate the existence, the uniqueness and the characterization of the Nash equilibria of the mixed CAC game. Recall that the utilities of the agents are given by (1), while the best response function is given by (4).
Our main result is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for an action configuration to be a Nash equilibrium of the game. The condition, which is a slight modification of (13), only involves the fractions of agents playing action +1 in the whole population and in the subsets V c and V a .
Given a Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X , we shortly denote z * := z(x * ), z * c := z c (x * ) and z * a := z a (x * ). Theorem 1. Consider the mixed CAC game.
(1) A Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X satisfies
for every c ∈ (0, 1 n ] and a ∈ ( 1 n , 2 n ].
(2) Given z * ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 , z * c ∈ {0, 1 nc , . . . , 1}, z * a ∈ {0, 1 na , . . . , 1} satisfying (14), there exists a Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X such that z(x * ) = z * , z c (x * ) = z * c and z a (x * ) = z * a .
Remark 1. The Nash equilibrium whose existence is guaranteed by (2) can be built in the following way. First, we set the actions of the coordinating agents i ∈ V c accordingly to the following formula
Then, we force the actions of the anti-coordinating agents i ∈ V a to satisfy
Finally, we set the actions of the anti-coordinating agents i ∈ V a having thresholds r i ∈ [ n n−1 (z * − 1 n ), n n−1 z * ] in such a way that the condition z * (x * ) = z * is satisfied. In general, the associated Nash equilibrium is not unique.
Proposition 1 gives a tool to investigate the existence of Nash equilibria of the mixed CAC game. Furthermore, it permits to characterize all the Nash equilibria of the game. Indeed, if we find all the possible triples of fractions z * c , z * a and z * satisfying (14), then we are able to build all the Nash equilibria of the game.
Remark. Note that, given a triple z * c , z * a , z * satisfying (14), it is enough to know the value of z * to find z * c and z * a . Hence, there are at most n + 1 triples satisfying the conditions in (14) . Recalling that the discoordination game admits no Nash equilibria, we have that, in general, 0 ≤ |Z| ≤ n + 1 where we denote by Z the set of the solutions of (14).
In the following sections, we analyze the coordination game and the anti-coordination game as special cases having α = 1 and α = 0, respectively.
Nash equilibria of the coordination game
We focus on the coordination game, i.e., V c = V. We recall that, since the game is potential, the existence of Nash equilibria is guaranteed. Proposition 1 provides a characterization of all the Nash equilibria of the game.
A straightforward substitution of α = 1 in (14) leads to Corollary 1, that provides a sufficient and necessary condition for an action configuration to be a Nash equilibrium based on the relation between the fraction z * of agents playing action +1 and the threshold CDF F c . Corollary 1. Consider the coordination game.
for every c ∈ (0, 1 n ].
(2) Given z * ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 satisfying (17), there exists a Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X such that z(x * ) = z * .
Remark. The Nash equilibrium whose existence is guaranteed by (2) can be built by setting the actions of the agents accordingly to (15). For any z * satisfying (17), the associated Nash equilibrium is unique.
Remark. A solution of (17) is a fraction z * such that
where F − c (z) := lim a→z − F c (a) denotes the left limit of F c in z. This is the same as asking that (1) z * is a fixed point of F − c ( n n−1 z * ) (2) z * is such that the threshold CDF F c is flat before z * for an interval that is large at least 1 n . If there are no stubborn agents, then F (0) = 0 and F ( n−1 n ) = 1 and, therefore, z 0 = 0 and z 1 = 1 are solutions of (17). The two solutions correspond to the two consensus configurations.
There might be other solutions, different from consensus configurations. More specifically there can be up to n + 1 solutions, as shown in Example 3. Hence, recalling that N denotes the set of the Nash equilibria of the game and Z denotes the set of the solutions of (17), we have the following result. Proposition 2. The coordination game admits |N | = |K| Nash equilibria over K n , where 1 ≤ |K| ≤ n + 1.
Example 3. Given the set of thresholds r i = 0, 1 n−1 , . . . , 1, for i ∈ V, the condition in (17) admits the n + 1 solutions z = 0, 1 n , . . . , 1, as shown in Fig. 4 . Hence, the associated coordination game admits n + 1 Nash equilibria.
We remark that a fixed point of F c ( n n−1 z) is a solution of (17) only if there is a flat interval preceding the fixed point that is at least large 1 n . We provide an example where F c ( n n−1 z) admits a fixed point, but the game admits no Nash equilibria.
Example 4. Let n > 0 be an odd number. We consider a set of thresholds
In Fig. 5 we observe that z * = n−1 2n is a fixed point of F c ( n n−1 z) but it is not a solution of (17). Accordingly, note that, if we consider an action configuration x * where z(x * ) = z * , then agents playing action +1 are not in equilibrium. Indeed,
Nash equilibria of the anti-coordination game
We focus on the anti-coordination game, i.e. V a = V. The existence of Nash equilibria is again guaranteed by the potential property, even though a complete characterization of them is not given. Proposition 1 provides a characterization of all the Nash equilibria of the game.
A straightforward substitution of α = 0 in (14) leads to Corollary 3, that provides a sufficient and necessary condition for an action configuration to be a Nash equilibrium based on the fraction z * of agents playing action +1 and the threshold CCDF G a . Fig. 5 . In Example 4, z 0 = 0 and z 1 = 1 are the only solutions of (17). Even if z * = n−1 2n is a fixed point of F c ( n n−1 z), the function is not flat in the interval [z * − 1 n , z * ).
Corollary 3. Consider the anti-coordination game.
(1) A Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X satisfies G a n n − 1 (z * − a ) ≥ z * ≥ G a n n − 1 z *
for every a ∈ ( 1 n , 2 n ].
(2) Given z * ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 satisfying (18), there exists a Nash equilibrium x * ∈ X such that z(x * ) = z * .
Remark. The Nash equilibrium whose existence is guaranteed by (2) can be built by setting the actions of part of the agents as in (16) and the remaining actions in such a way that the condition z * (x * ) = z * is met. Note that the associated Nash equilibrium is, in general, not unique.
Remark.
A solution of (18) is a fraction z * such that G − a n n − 1 (z * − 1 n ) ≥ z * ≥ G a n n − 1 z * where G − a (z) denotes the left limit of G a in z. Note that a fixed point z * ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 of the threshold CCDF, namely z * = G a ( n n−1 z * ), satisfies (18). If G a has no fixed points, it is possible to prove that the inequality in (18) is satisfied by the first fraction z * for which the bisector is over (or equal to) the function G a , i.e. z * ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 such that
Proposition 4. Given a threshold CCDF G a , the fraction z * ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 satisfying (19) is a solution of (18). Such a z * always exists since G a is non-increasing with codomain [0, 1]. An example is shown in Fig. 6 .
We proved that there are at most two z ∈ 0, 1 n , . . . , 1 satisfying (18). Indeed, if there is a sufficiently big jump between G a (z * ) and G a (z * − ), > 0 sufficiently small, then z * * = z * + 1 n−1 satisfies (18) too. We remark that this is the only other possible solution. An example of this situation is shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 6 . An example where inequality in (18) admits the unique solution z * = 9 18 . Let us denote z 1 := G a n n − 1 z * z 2 := G − a n n − 1 (z * − 1 n ) .
(20)
We have the following result on the number of Nash equilibria of the anti-coordination game.
Proposition 5. The anti-coordination game admits exactly
Nash equilibria over K n , where 1 ≤ |Z| ≤ 2.
Hence, if |Z| = 1 and z * = z 1 or z * = z 2 , the game admits exactly one Nash equilibrium. Indeed, recalling the construction of Nash equilibria from z * , we see that there is just one possible choice for the set of the agents playing action 1 in a Nash equilibrium configuration.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered mixed ensembles of agents playing coordinating and anti-coordinating agents with possibly different activation thresholds. We found a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria in terms of the distribution of the thresholds in the ensemble and an explicit characterization of Nash equilibria when do exist.
Current work includes the extension of this analysis to the case when agents are confined to interact through a network. Preliminary results in this direction can be found in Vanelli (2019) . Also, we are interested in the behavior of evolutionary dynamics associated to these games, such as the the best response dynamics.
